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Untangling Attorney Retainers from Creditor Claims 
Abstract. Clients will often use a retainer to secure an attorney’s 
representation.  But clients in economic distress may have creditors that are 
eager to access the client’s funds in the attorney’s hands.  Attorneys, clients, 
courts, and regulators have struggled to understand who has the best claim to 
such retainer funds.  In this Article, we attempt to untangle the most common 
areas of confusion.  We conclude that Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC) offers strong protection for an attorney’s interest in client retainers 
through security interests, even though some courts have misapplied the UCC 
in this context.  Further, we recommend that regulatory bodies create 
educational programs to help attorneys and courts understand how to apply 
Article 9 to security interest and also recommend that attorneys help clients 
understand the benefits and drawbacks of granting a security interest in retainer 
funds. 
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When can a client’s creditors reach retainer funds paid to the client’s 
attorney?1  This question comes up with regularity, as clients in economic 
distress may be more likely to seek—and to need—legal counsel.2  The issue 
can arise at different stages in the litigation.  Sometimes it comes up well 
after an attorney has accepted a retainer from the client when the client’s 
creditors later seek to recover some or all of those funds.3  Sometimes it 
emerges after the attorney’s client has filed for bankruptcy, with the 
bankruptcy trustee arguing that some or all of the retainer belongs in the 
bankruptcy estate.4  Frequently the question arises even before 
 
1. There is also a separate question of when creditors can attach funds held by a client’s attorney, 
as when the attorney holds settlement proceeds for distribution.  This is also a vexing problem worthy 
of future research, but it is outside the scope of this Article.  See ROBERT P. SCHUWERK & LILLIAN B. 
HARDWICK, 48 HANDBOOK OF TEXAS LAWYER AND JUDICIAL ETHICS § 6:14 (2021 ed.) (“[T]here is 
now some question as to whether a non-client has any basis for a civil action against a lawyer for failing 
to pay the non-client a sum due and owing to it out of a client’s recovery.”) (citing U.S. Bank Nat’l 
Ass’n v. Sheena, 479 S.W.3d 475 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.)). 
2. See Dowling v. Chi. Options Assocs., Inc., 875 N.E.2d 1012, 1022 (Ill. 2007) (explaining 
creditors’ claims “could make it difficult for the client to hire legal counsel”). 
3. See Hadassah v. Schwartz, 966 N.E.2d 298, 299 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (“BG&L answered in 
the garnishment action and acknowledged that it held $150,000 of Schwartz’s property in an IOLTA 
account.”); see also Jackson Walker LLP v. F.D.I.C., 13 F. Supp. 3d 953, 961 (D. Minn. 2014)  (describing 
the disagreement between the parties over whether the retainer funds were intended to be used for 
legal fees). 
4. See In re King, 392 B.R. 62, 66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (objecting to the use of the retainer to 
pay the law firm when the estate assets are uncertain and arguing that lesser priority claims should not 
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representation begins when the attorney tries to craft a retainer agreement 
that minimizes the risk of leaving retainer funds vulnerable to claims from 
the client’s creditors.  
Attorneys, clients, courts, and even regulatory authorities have struggled 
to articulate and apply a consistent set of rules when faced with creditors’ 
claims to funds held by attorneys.  This confusion has caused problems both 
at the regulatory level and at the individual level.  An apparent 
misunderstanding of the relative priorities led at least one state to change its 
ethics rules in ways that create a risk of client harm for little, if any, 
countervailing benefit.5  A second state has followed the same path through 
judicial interpretation.6   
Lawyers who overestimate the risks of accepting security retainers may 
be unnecessarily reluctant to offer representation to clients facing creditor 
claims.7  At the same time, lawyers who undertake representation may be 
ill-positioned to explain why their right to be paid from client retainers 
should prevail over the claims of competing creditors.8  In the worst-case 
scenario, lawyers may forfeit valid claims to those funds, prompting an 
outcome unfavorable to both the lawyer and client.9 
This Article attempts to untangle some of the most common areas of 
confusion.  Part I begins by examining the various types of retainers 
commonly used and analyzing how these retainer types fit into an attorney’s 
duty to safeguard client property—is the retainer at issue a security retainer, 
a general retainer, an advance-payment retainer, or an “evergreen” 
 
be paid before administrative solvency is ensured); In re Shafer Bros. Constr. Inc., 525 B.R. 607, 
612 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2015) (“MPRT disputes the reasonableness of the compensation sought by 
[d]ebtor’s [c]ounsel and whether [d]ebtor’s [c]ounsel may be paid, to the extent the court finds the 
compensation to be reasonable, from the $20,000 retainer located in Mr. Johnson’s client trust 
account.”); In re Zukowski, 237 B.R. 194, 198 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (“[C]ourts have wrestled with 
the issue of whether a debtor’s attorney has any interest in the earned portion of a retainer . . . .”). 
5. See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing a client’s risk when New York law requires an 
attorney to deposit an advance retainer into the attorney’s operating account rather than a client’s trust 
account). 
6. See discussion infra Part III.A (permitting the practice of advance-payments in Illinois as well 
as New York). 
7. See discussion infra Part III.A (identifying a problem where an attorney may not represent a 
client vulnerable to a creditor’s reach).  
8. See discussion infra Part III.B (discouraging a lawyer from preventing a client from 
terminating representation by charging a non-refundable retainer). 
9. See discussion infra Part III.B (risking a lawyer’s complicity in asset concealment through 
advance-payment retainers). 
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retainer?10  The type of retainer makes a difference as to whether the funds 
belong to the client or the attorney, and thus whether they are properly held 
in a trust account for the client or placed in the lawyer’s own office account 
where they may be spent or dissipated.  
The ownership question is only part of the puzzle however.  Part II 
discusses how Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) interacts 
with security retainers.  It explains that even when the funds still belong to 
the client—as with a retainer for security—the attorney will typically have a 
perfected security interest with priority over most competing claimants.11  
Part II further explores cases where courts failed to recognize the attorney’s 
security interest, exploring how the complexities of Article 9 create 
difficulties for non-specialist attorneys and judges who struggle to apply the 
UCC.12   
Part III discusses how attorney regulatory bodies have compounded 
these difficulties by expanding “advance-payment” retainers into situations 
normally covered by security retainers.  It argues that Illinois and New York 
have allowed attorneys to treat unearned payments as earned, bypassing 
client trust accounts altogether.13  This practice introduces new risks to 
clients and creates uncertainty without offering any significantly greater 
protection than the UCC already provides to security retainers.  Part III also 
explains how the Illinois and New York positions increase the risk that 
unscrupulous clients will be able to use attorney retainers to improperly 
conceal assets.  Finally, Part IV offers suggestions to help attorneys invoke 
the protection offered under the UCC and to guide attorney regulatory 
bodies in adopting rules that protect client funds without impairing attorney 
interests. 
I.    TYPES OF RETAINERS 
In legal practice, the term “retainer” refers to a sum of money transferred 
from a client to the lawyer or law firm when hired.  Beyond that basic 
definition, however, the term can have several different meanings depending 
on the purpose underlying that transaction.  This section sets out the most 
common retainer types and purposes, but these categories are not mutually 
 
10. See discussion infra Part I (detailing the types of retainers). 
11. See discussion infra Part II.A (discussing elements needed to create a security interest). 
12. See discussion infra Part II.B (describing when a security interest is unsuccessful). 
13. See discussion infra Part III (discussing the practice of regulating retainers). 
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exclusive.  It is common for attorneys to create retainer agreements that 
include features of more than one category.14 
A. The Retainer for Security 
 The most common type of retainer serves as security for payment.  That 
is, the client pre-pays some or all the expected cost of the representation.  
The lawyer, who will commonly be billing by the hour, holds the funds in 
trust for the client until the work is performed.  This procedure allows the 
lawyer to ensure that the client will be able to pay for the representation, 
and it reduces the risk of mid-representation payment disputes between 
lawyer and client.15  The funds held in trust for the client continue to belong 
to the client until the lawyer earns them by performing work.  When the 
lawyer’s representation terminates—whether through the natural end of the 
matter or through early termination by either party—the money held in trust 
must be promptly returned to the client.  On the other hand, if the matter 
becomes more complicated than expected, the lawyer may ask the client for 
additional funds beyond the initial retainer.16 
Attorney Mark White offered an example of an agreement establishing a 
security retainer: 
Client agrees to deposit the sum of $50,000 with the firm, to be billed against 
on an hourly basis as set out above.  This advance deposit will be held in the 
firm’s trust account until such time as it, or a portion of it is earned, at which 
time it will be made available to the firm’s general account.  Monthly 
statements will be sent to the client as provided above.  These statements will 
be paid from the advance deposit thirty days after the date of the statements.  
 
14. See Alex B. Long, Attorney–Client Fee Agreements That Offend Public Policy, 61 S.C. L. REV. 287, 
320 (2009) (“[I]n practice, lawyers often use hybrid retainers, thus making it difficult to draw any 
meaningful distinction between the two.”). 
15. Payment security is especially important to attorneys because the ethics rules preclude the 
attorney from immediately ceasing representation whenever the client fails to pay.  See MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (providing nonpayment of fees can be grounds 
for withdrawal, but the attorney will still generally need permission from the tribunal); see also Lester 
Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1, 34 (1993) 
(“Permission to withdraw from a criminal case is almost always required by rules of criminal tribunals 
and is rarely granted.”). 
16. Sample Retainer Agreement, WILLICK LAW GROUP, https://willicklawgroup.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2012/10/TMC0058.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK36-CQDK]. 
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At the conclusion of the matter, the balance of the advance deposit will be 
returned the client.17 
This language is clear and understandable to the client.  The idea of 
security is implicit in the agreement, and almost certainly understood by 
both sides.  In the example given, the amount of the retainer is likely at a 
level sufficient to cover the attorney’s estimated fee for the representation.  
The agreement establishes an expectation that that retainer will be sufficient 
to cover the expected work, and it clarifies the return of any leftover funds 
to the client at the end.  
Even though the idea of security is implicit in White’s language, it may be 
worth more explicitly stating that the purpose of holding the funds is to 
provide security for payment.  A retainer agreement from the Willick Law 
Group uses language that explicitly references security: “it is intended that 
the retainer fee deposit will be held and used as a security deposit until the 
conclusion of the case and [c]lient’s payment of all outstanding costs, 
expenses, and fees for legal services.”18  The explicit use of the word 
“security” is unlikely to make a difference to the client, who almost certainly 
understood the purpose of the retainer from the billing structure set out 
above.  Nonetheless, as discussed later, using the term “security” can aid 
courts looking for easily verifiable documentation of a security interest.19 
B. The Engagement Retainer Fee 
A second type of retainer is one used to formalize the attorney–client 
relationship and to secure availability, sometimes called a “classic” or 
“general” retainer, though support is growing for calling it an “engagement 
retainer fee.”20  The “classic” or “general” nomenclature can be somewhat 
confusing, as it “is really only ‘classic’ in the sense that it relates to antiquity,” 
 
17. See Mark D. White, Fee Agreements That Work: Examples & Samples, in STATE BAR OF TEX. 
35TH ANN. ADVANCED CIV. TRIAL COURSE 2012 7 (2012), http://www.texasbarcle.com/ 
Materials/Events/11381/145035_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9XS-N5T6] (providing an example of 
an agreement establishing a security retainer). 
18. Sample Retainer Agreement, supra note 16. 
19. See infra discussion in Part II (positioning “security” as a catch-all phrase that allows courts 
to verify security interests quickly and effectively). 
20. See White, supra note 17, at 7–8 (describing the engagement retainer as “an amount of money 
that the client pays you solely for the privilege of having you as his lawyer”). 
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and is not actually common in modern practice.21  In fact, engagement 
retainers are much rarer than retainers intended as a security.22   
The engagement retainer acts almost like an option contract, establishing 
that the client has hired the lawyer and “thereby prevent[ing] him from 
acting for his adversary.”23  The engagement retainer “establishes the 
employment of the attorney by the client” but does not compensate for any 
actual work performed by the attorney.24 An engagement retainer is 
considered earned upon receipt and is to be deposited into the attorney’s 
office account, not into the client trust account.  When the attorney 
performs work for the client, those hours are usually billed separately, as the 
retainer compensates only for the attorney’s availability and not for the work 
performed.25   
White also sets out an example of how to reasonably communicate the 
engagement retainer to the client: 
In addition to paying for the service on an hourly basis . . . the client agrees to 
pay [the] firm an engagement retainer fee in the amount of $10,000.  Such fee 
is paid in order to secure the firm’s immediate availability and readiness to 
undertake this representation, and in recognition that due to the publicity of 
this matter, the firm is likely to be prevented from accepting other legal work 
in this area.  The $10,000 engagement retainer fee is not refundable, and client 
agrees that it is earned by the firm immediately.26   
This language makes it clear to the client that the fee pays only for 
establishing an attorney–client relationship and that fees for time expended 
will be separately billed.   
C. The “Evergreen” Retainer 
An “evergreen” retainer provides partial security to the attorney while still 
allowing the client to pay for the representation over time rather than all at 
 
21. Milton Williams & Christopher Dioguardi, Retaining the ‘Right’ Retainer: Classic, Security or 
Advance-Payment?, N.Y. L.J. (2021). 
22. See Dowling v. Chi. Options Assocs., Inc., 875 N.E.2d 1012, 1021 (Ill. 2007) 
(“In the vast majority of cases, [the client’s interest] will dictate that funds paid to retain a lawyer will 
be considered a security retainer and placed in a client trust account.”). 
23. Union Sur. & Guar. Co. v. Tenney, 65 N.E. 688, 690 (Ill. 1902). 
24. Dowling, 875 N.E.2d at 1017. 
25. See Tenney, 65 N.E. at 690 (notating a retainer precedes the rendering of services). 
26. White, supra note 17, at 8.  
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once.27  Firms find them useful “when a client can’t pay—or would prefer 
not to pay—a larger single retainer upfront.”28  That is, rather than pay 
$20,000 upfront, the client might pay only $4,000.  As the lawyer does work 
on the case, however, the client will continue to “replenish” the retainer at 
regular intervals so that the amount of money held in the retainer never dips 
below the agreed-upon amount (the retainer stays “evergreen” because there 
is always a certain baseline of funds in the account).  Evergreen retainers 
may combine monthly billing with a minimum retainer, as in the following 
example:  
In addition to payment of the monthly statements, we ask that the company 
wire a retainer in the amount of $10,000 to be held in our trust account and 
to be billed against.  We ask that the trust balance be maintained at the level 
of $10,000, and our monthly statements will reflect the balance necessary to 
maintain that amount.  Of course, at the conclusion of the litigation, any 
balance in the trust account will be promptly refunded to the company.29   
As with a pure retainer for security, the attorney should consider explicitly 
referring to the purpose of the retainer as providing security for payment.  
In the case of the evergreen retainer, the minimum trust balance can be 
called a “minimum security deposit” for clarity.30   
D. The Advance-Payment Retainer 
Some states also classify the advance payment of legal fees as a separate 
type of retainer.  The idea of an advance-payment retainer is still somewhat 
controversial however, and its purpose, limits, and requirements remain 
somewhat indeterminate.   
The advance payment of attorney fees arises most commonly with a flat-
fee arrangement.  The flat fee offers predictability to the client—they know 
 
27. See Douglas R. Richmond, Understanding Retainers and Flat Fees, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 113, 117 
(2009) (“An evergreen retainer is designed to minimize a lawyer’s risk of nonpayment if the client’s 
financial condition deteriorates over the course of the representation, or should the client for some 
other reason decline or be unable to pay the lawyer’s fees as they come due.”). 
28. Teresa Matich, A Guide to Evergreen Retainers for Law Firms, CLIO (Aug. 26, 2021), 
https://www.clio.com/blog/evergreen-retainers-law-firms/ [https://perma.cc/LCK2-85UW]. 
29. White, supra note 17, at 7. 
30. See supra discussion in Part I.A (discussing the legal ramifications of a “minimum security 
deposit”). 
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ahead of time what the representation will cost.31  This works best with 
cases that are fairly standardized—for example, attorneys defending clients 
charged with driving while intoxicated often charge flat fees.32  The attorney 
knows that some cases will be more complex than average (allowing the 
client to pay less than they would have with hourly billing), and some cases 
will resolve more quickly than average (allowing the attorney to earn a higher 
fee than they would have with hourly billing).  With a flat-fee arrangement, 
the client benefits from the predictability of cost.  The lawyer is better able 
to bear the risk that the representation will be more complex than 
anticipated because the lawyer can spread that risk over many cases, 
knowing that the average fee will provide sufficient compensation.   
When this flat fee is paid in advance of the representation, it is normally 
considered to be “nonrefundable” and earned on receipt—meaning that the 
attorney properly puts the advance payment into the attorney’s office 
account from the beginning and does not need to hold it in the client trust 
account.33  This process is not without controversy, however.34  Difficulties 
arise when the flat-fee “nonrefundable” payment clashes with the client’s 
right to terminate the attorney’s representation.35  Courts have uniformly 
held that even “nonrefundable” retainers are, in fact, refundable when the 
lawyer has not yet done substantial work on the case—to hold otherwise 
 
31. See, e.g., N.Y. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 1202 (2020) (“A fixed fee is often 
appropriate in matters frequently performed by the lawyer, where it is possible for the lawyer to 
accurately estimate the cost of performing the services.  It is beneficial to the client since the client 
knows in advance the cost of the services and is not subject to inefficiencies that may increase the fee 
in the case of hourly billing.”). 
32. How much does a DUI attorney cost?, THUMBTACK (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.thumbtack. 
com/p/dui-lawyer-cost [https://perma.cc/Y3VD-DQBZ]. 
33. See Richmond, supra note 27, at 132 (“It is said to be the majority rule that lawyers may, with 
client consent—typically confirmed in writing—treat flat fees as earned upon receipt and therefore not 
entrusted.”); see also Bd. of Prof’l Resp. v. Reguli, 489 S.W.3d 408, 421 (Tenn. 2015) (defining an 
“advance fee retainer” as one “intended to compensate the lawyer for all work to be done on a 
matter, . . . more commonly known as a ‘fixed’ or ‘flat fee,’ and providing that it ‘is also earned upon 
receipt, assuming the lawyer is available to perform the services’”); Dowling v. Chi. Options Assocs., 
Inc., 875 N.E.2d 1021–22 (Ill. 2007); In re Conduct of Balocca, 151 P.3d 154, 160 (Or. 2007); In re 
Connelly, 55 P.3d 756, 761–62 (Ariz. 2002); Alaska Bar Ass’n Comm., Ethics Op. 87–1 (1987); N.C. 
State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 4 (1998). 
34. See ROBERT L. ROSSI, TYPES OF RETAINERS—NONREFUNDABLE RETAINERS § 1:3 (3d ed. 
2020) (“The use of nonrefundable retainers or nonrefundable fee advances has become the subject of 
increasing controversy in recent years.”). 
35. See Steven Lubet, The Rush to Remedies: Some Conceptual Questions About Nonrefundable Retainers, 
73 N.C. L. REV. 271, 282 (1994) (explaining this issue but cautioning that just because “a lawyer may 
always be fired does not mean that there should never be economic consequences to the client”). 
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would infringe the client’s right to terminate the attorney’s representation 
and would violate the rules of professional conduct, which require that the 
total fee be “reasonable.”36  Thus, states have made it clear that “a lawyer 
may still have a duty to refund fees which have been considered property of 
the attorney and not held in trust.”37  Some courts have gone further and 
have required attorneys to treat flat fees as earned over time, rather than 
immediately—meaning attorneys should keep at least part of the flat fee in 
the client’s trust account and communicate to the client at what stages the 
fee is considered earned.38 
Attorney Mark White suggests language for how an attorney could 
communicate an earned-over-time flat fee to the client:  
My fee for this representation described above is $25,000.  This is a fixed fee 
[that] includes an[y] expenses that I may advance, and is not dependent on the 
course or outcome of the litigation or upon the time I spend on the matter.  
The fee is due in a lump sum in advance.  This money will be held in trust, 
and withdrawn by me []as earned.  It will be considered earned as follows: 
10% after initial interviews and case investigation; 40% after discovery, pre-
trial motions and hearings; 50% after trial.  The full fee will be considered 
earned upon termination of proceedings by trial or settlement, regardless of 
whether all proceedings have occurred and regardless of time expended or 
outcome.  If my representation is terminated before completion of the 
engagement, I will be entitled to the reasonable value of my services, and any 
 
36. See Cluck v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 214 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, 
no pet.) (stating “[a] fee is not earned simply because it is designated as nonrefundable”); In re 
Cooperman, 187 A.D.2d 56, 61 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (“By his own admission contained in his 
affidavit in opposition, the respondent used his retainer agreements to prevent his clients from 
exercising their right to discharge him.”); Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 431, 49 Tex. B.J. 1084 
(1986). 
37. See In re Disciplinary Action Against Hoffman, 834 N.W.2d 636, 646 (N.D. 2013) (citing  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011)). 
38. See In re O’Farrell, 942 N.E.2d 799, 807–08 (Ind. 2011) (providing that “a fee agreement 
could designate a reasonable part of the initial payment that would be deemed earned by the attorney 
for opening the case and beginning the representation,” but suggesting that “[p]erhaps the entire flat 
fee could be deemed earned if the client deals unfairly with the attorney or refuses to cooperate with 
the attorney, and then either fires the attorney or makes continuation of the representation ethically 
impossible after the attorney expends considerable time and effort on the case”); Cluck, 214 S.W.3d 
at 740 (holding “[a] fee is not earned simply because it is designated as nonrefundable” and requiring 
that unearned fees—including those designated as nonrefundable—be held in a client trust account 
until actually earned). 
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remaining balance will be refunded.  I will notify you when funds are 
withdrawn from trust and will account for funds remaining in trust.39   
This language tracks requirements in states, such as Texas, that consider 
unearned fees as remaining the client’s property and held in trust for the 
client.40  Other states, however, may allow the entire fee to be immediately 
placed in the lawyer’s operating account even though the fee is still subject 
to possible reimbursement if the representation is terminated before the 
attorney has done sufficient work on the case to render the fee reasonably 
earned.41   
Advance-payment retainers are controversial when they allow refundable 
fees to be held outside attorney trust accounts and even more so when they 
are applied to hourly fees, rather than limited to flat fees, thus allowing 
unearned hourly payments to be held outside of client trust accounts.42  The 
process allows the attorney and client to treat unearned fees as if fully 
earned, bypassing the client trust account altogether.  As legal ethics 
scholar Douglas Richmond has argued, “making advance[-]payment 
retainers refundable necessarily transforms them into security 
retainers . . . .”43  Nevertheless, at least two large states—Illinois and New 
York—have permitted this structure, primarily as an attempt to shield the 
funds from claims by client creditors.44  Illinois even amended its rules of 
professional conduct to facilitate such arrangements.45  
 
39. White, supra note 17, at 7–8. 
40. Cluck, 214 S.W.3d at 740 (“Advance fee payments must be held in a trust account until they 
are earned.”). 
41. Richmond notes that courts “allowing lawyers to treat flat fees as non-refundable is 
undesirable” because it “[o]stensibly encourag[es]” lawyers to refuse repayment when they do “little or 
none of the work for which the fee was paid.”  Richmond, supra note 27, at 132. 
42. Id. at 138. 
43. Richmond, supra note 27, at 138. 
44. Dowling v. Chi. Options Assocs., Inc., 875 N.E.2d 1012, 1021 (Ill. 2007); N.Y. State Bar 
Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 1202 (2020); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 816 
(2007) (allowing for advance-payment retainers and providing that they should be held outside the 
client trust account, even though they would be refundable to the extent that they were not earned; 
suggesting that the purpose such a retainer is to avoid “deposit[ing] such a retainer in a client trust 
account, [where] the funds would remain the property of the client and might be subject to claims of 
the client’s creditors, thereby making it difficult for the client to retain counsel”). 
45. See ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(c) (2021) (providing that “an advance[-
]payment retainer shall be deposited in the lawyer’s general account or other account belonging to the 
lawyer,” and that “[a]n advance[-]payment retainer may be used only when necessary to accomplish 
some purpose for the client that cannot be accomplished by using a security retainer.”); see also id. 
at R. 1.15 cmt. 3(c) (“An advance[-]payment retainer is a present payment to the lawyer in exchange for 
  
154 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 12:142 
Richmond accurately notes that this treatment of advance-payment 
retainers is essentially a “sleight of hand” that attempts to re-brand security 
retainers as pre-paid funds “that need not be held in trust with respect to 
clients” to avoid “expos[ing] them to clients’ creditors.”46  Richmond 
criticizes the Illinois and New York approach to advance-payment retainers 
as “needlessly impair[ing] the rights of clients’ legitimate creditors.”47  In 
this Article, we agree with the criticism of these retainers but for a slightly 
different reason.  Advance-payment retainers are unlikely to directly affect 
the rights of legitimate creditors because security retainers already offer 
substantial protection against client creditors.48  In situations where 
creditors could lawfully reach the attorney retainer, holding those funds in 
the lawyers’ operating account instead of the client trust account will not 
shield the funds.49  Thus, the advance-payment retainer, as interpreted by 
Illinois and New York, fails in its purpose of protecting against creditor 
claims.  At the same time, however, allowing an advance-payment retainer 
for unearned fees increases other risks—most notably, it makes the retainer 
vulnerable to dissipation and to claims by the lawyer’s own creditors.  The 
advance-payment retainer also risks impairing the rights of legitimate 
creditors: it makes it easier for unscrupulous clients to conceal assets, and it 
increases the risks that lawyers will be complicit (either inadvertently or 
intentionally) in clients’ efforts to do so. 
 
the commitment to provide legal services in the future.  Ownership of this retainer passes to the lawyer 
immediately upon payment; and the retainer may not be deposited into a client trust account because 
a lawyer may not commingle property of a client with the lawyer’s own property.  However, any portion 
of an advance[-]payment retainer that is not earned must be refunded to the client.  An advance[-
]payment retainer should be used sparingly, only when necessary to accomplish a purpose for the client 
that cannot be accomplished by using a security retainer.  An advance[-]payment retainer agreement 
must be in a written agreement signed by the client that contains the elements listed in paragraph (c).  
An advance[-]payment retainer is distinguished from a fixed fee (also described as a ‘flat’ or ‘lump-sum’ 
fee), where the lawyer agrees to provide a specific service (e.g., defense of a criminal charge, a real 
estate closing, or preparation of a will or trust) for a fixed amount.  Unlike an advance[-]payment 
retainer, a fixed fee is generally not subject to the obligation to refund any portion to the client, although 
a fixed fee is subject, like all fees, to the requirement of Rule 1.5(a) that a lawyer may not charge or 
collect an unreasonable fee”). 
46. Richmond, supra note 27, at 138. 
47. Id. 
48. See discussion infra Part II.A (explaining the protection offered by security retainers). 
49. WILLIAM L. NORTON III, 2 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 30:10 (3d ed. 
2021) (“By taking a retainer—even though it is considered a security retainer—a professional becomes 
a secured creditor, and hence has a claim on the retained funds prior to any other administrative 
claimant.”). 
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II.    SECURITY INTERESTS IN ATTORNEY RETAINERS 
Funds held in a client trust account, even though still owned by the client, 
nevertheless maintain some protection from claims by the client’s creditors.  
Both courts and leading bankruptcy authorities agree that an attorney who 
holds client funds as security for payment generally has a valid security 
interest in those funds under Article 9 of the UCC.50  Attorneys who 
practice outside the commercial law or bankruptcy realms may not realize 
the protection that Article 9 offers and may not have taken any affirmative 
steps to comply with the UCC’s requirements.  Even so, the Code is written 
broadly enough to apply. 
A. An Article 9 Security Interest 
No particular language or “magic words” are necessary to create a security 
interest.51  Article 9 applies to “a transaction, regardless of its form, that 
creates a [contractual] security interest in personal property[,]” including 
money.52  The official comments make clear that Article 9 will apply 
“regardless of the form of the transaction or the name that parties have 
given to it.”53  As long as the transaction offers an “interest in personal 
 
50. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 328.02 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th 
ed. 2021) (“With respect to ‘secured’ retainers, courts generally hold that a professional with such a 
prepetition retainer is a ‘secured creditor’ and has a security interest in the retainer . . . by virtue of a 
possessory interest in cash.”); In re On-Line Servs. Ltd., 324 B.R. 342, 346–47 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005) 
(“A security retainer involves the attorney holding the client’s money as a pledge—a possessory security 
interest—and the Uniform Commercial Code expressly allows for a possessory security interest in 
money.”); In re North Bay Tractor, Inc., 191 B.R. 186, 187–88 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding “[t]he 
attorney’s interest in such a retainer is in the nature of a security interest, assuring the attorney of a 
minimum fee in the case” and stating that requiring the attorney to give up the retainer “would 
undermine the purpose of retainers . . . .”); In re K & R Mining, Inc., 105 B.R. 394, 398 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 1989) (stating that “the court finds that applicant possesses a security interest in the retainer to 
secure payment of its attorney’s fees and expenses . . . .”); In re Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 90 B.R. 
942, 944 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (“The debtor’s attorney who receives a prepetition retainer to insure 
payment of fees . . . becomes a secured creditor, secured by a possessory security interest in cash.  
There is nothing theoretically different between the attorney who receives a retainer against future fees 
and a landlord who takes a cash security deposit to secure the payment of future rents.” (citations 
omitted)).  
51. See, e.g., Silver Creek Supply v. Powell, 521 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (“The 
creation of a security interest does not mandate the usage of a form or document so entitled, nor does 
it require any magical recitation of language to establish the existence of a security interest.”); U.C.C. 
§ 1-201(b)(35) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020) (defining “security interest” as “an interest in 
personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation”). 
52. U.C.C. § 9-109(a). 
53. Id. § 9-109 cmt. 2. 
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property” which secures payment or performance of an obligation, it will 
qualify as a security interest under the UCC.54  
As long as the attorney and the client agree that the retainer secures 
payment, it does not matter whether they call it a security interest, and it 
does not matter whether they intend to invoke the UCC.55  Under Article 9, 
the security interest will become enforceable as between the parties when 
three requirements are met: (1) “value has been given”; (2) the client “has 
rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral” to the 
attorney; and (3) the agreement is evidenced either through a signed security 
agreement or by transferring possession or control of the collateral to the 
attorney.56  “Value” is defined broadly, including “any consideration 
sufficient to support a simple contract.”57  
Two of the three requirements are easily satisfied: the attorney’s promise 
to provide representation counts as value, and the funds handed over as a 
retainer usually belong to the client, thus satisfying the requirement that the 
debtor has rights in the collateral.58  The third requirement is an evidentiary 
requirement, intended to offer an objective indication of the parties’ intent 
to create a security interest.59  It can be satisfied by a writing signed by the 
client—a signed retainer agreement specifying holding funds as security for 
payment would suffice.60  But a written agreement is not necessarily 
required.  The evidentiary requirement can also be met through possession 
or control.61  As long as the parties orally agree that the funds will secure 
payment, then the lawyer’s possession of the funds, or control of the bank 
account where the funds are held, will suffice.  As a result, when the client 
hands over funds to secure payment for the attorney’s expected future 
services, the attorney has a security interest in those funds under Article 9.62  
No written agreement is necessary, as long as the parties have agreed 
 
54. See id. § 9-109(d) (offering certain exceptions not relevant attorney retainers). 
55. Id. § 9-109 cmt. 2. 
56. Id. § 9-203(b); see also id. § 9-102(a)(74) (defining “[s]ecurity agreement” as “an agreement 
that creates or provides for a security interest”). 
57. Id. § 1-204(4). 
58. Id. § 9-203(b). 
59. Id. § 9-203 cmt. 3. 
60. See In re Adv. Imaging Techs., Inc., 306 B.R. 677, 681 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2003) (“Under 
the [e]mployment [a]greement, the Debtor agreed that Gray Cary would hold the retainer funds to 
secure payment for future services rendered to the Debtor.”). 
61. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(B) & (D) (allowing either possession or control to meet the 
evidentiary requirement for enforceability). 
62. Id. § 9-203(d). 
  
2021] Untangling Attorney Retainers from Creditor Claims 157 
between themselves that the purpose of the transfer is to secure the payment 
of fees.   
The creation of a security interest is effective as between the debtor and 
creditor—or, as here, between the client and attorney.  For full protection 
under Article 9, however, the parties need more than just the creation of a 
valid security interest.  Specifically, Article 9 sets out a system of perfection 
for security interests (that is, a way to communicate the existence of those 
interests to outside parties) and priority of those interests.  Maximum 
protection comes from having a perfected security interest with priority over 
competing claimants.   
Here again, however, attorneys may have more protection than they 
realize.  The general priority rule under Article 9 for competing security 
interests is “the first to file or perfect.”63  That is, the first party with a 
security interest who either perfects that interest or files a financing 
statement will prevail over later creditors.  Most attorneys will perfect their 
interest without filing a financing statement, and this is not a problem.  
Under Article 9, a security interest may be perfected by possession of the 
collateral (and, with cash, possession is the only means of perfecting the 
security interest)64 or by control of a bank account (called a “deposit 
account” under the language of Article 9).65   
The attorney’s possession of the retainer (or control over the account 
holding the retainer)66 is thus sufficient both to create the underlying 
security interest and to perfect it.  Once the attorney has possession of the 
cash, the security interest has both attached to the funds and has been 
perfected by the attorney’s possession.67  This puts the attorney in a good 
position, as Article 9 gives the holder of a perfected security interest priority 
over later-acquired security interests.68  It is possible that the client may 
 
63. Id. § 9-322. 
64. Id. § 9-312(b)(3). 
65. Id. § 9-314(a); see also id. § 9-102(a)(29) (defining “deposit account”). 
66. See id. § 9-104(a) (describing how a secured party may exercise control over a deposit 
account). 
67. See Alan J. Wilson, The Who and What of Possession Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 14 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 143, 149 (2015) (“With respect to perfection by possession, a secured 
party’s security interest in collateral is perfected at the exact minute the secured party’s possession gives 
notice to other creditors or would give notice if other creditors looked for the collateral.”). 
68. U.C.C.§ 9-312(b); see also In re Shafer Bros. Constr. Inc., 525 B.R. 607, 619 
(Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 2015) (“Because Mr. Johnson possessed the $20,000 security retainer in a deposit 
account that he controlled—his Interest On Lawyer Trust Account (‘IOLTA’)—he held a perfected 
security interest in $5,950 thereof to secure the [d]ebtor’s payment for services rendered to that point 
in time.”). 
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have pre-existing secured parties who can claim an interest in the cash as 
proceeds of an earlier security interest. Even in that case, the attorney is 
likely protected, as the UCC allows a transferee of funds to take free of the 
security interests “unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in 
violating the rights of the secured party.”69 
The most likely competing claimant for attorneys, however, is not 
another secured creditor—instead, it is what Article 9 calls a “lien 
creditor.”70  A lien creditor can be one who “has acquired a lien on the 
property involved by attachment, levy, or the like[,]” “an assignee for benefit 
of creditors from the time of assignment[,]” or a receiver or bankruptcy 
trustee.71  A common example is a judgment creditor—someone who won 
a court judgment against the client in earlier litigation and later attempts to 
levy on the client’s property.  
Under Article 9, the holder of a perfected security interest has priority 
over someone who later becomes a lien creditor.72  The relevant date for 
lien creditor status is the date of the levy, not the date of the underlying debt 
or judgment.73  The relevant comparison date for perfection is the day that 
the attorney took possession or control of the funds.74  Thus, a client who 
owes funds to a judgment creditor could pay an attorney retainer, and the 
attorney would have priority in that retainer as long as the judgment creditor 
has not yet levied on the funds.  If, however, the judgment creditor had 
managed to levy on the funds before the retainer was paid, then the 
judgment creditor would have priority in those funds—but in that scenario, 
the money would not be available to pay the retainer in any case and thus 
would not have been in the attorney’s possession to begin with.  The UCC 
priority scheme offers significant protection to the attorney.  The attorney’s 
act of taking possession of the retainer funds puts the attorney in a superior 
position to the client’s creditors, who may later try to levy on those funds.  
 
69. U.C.C. § 9-332(a) (applying to cash transfers); Id. § 9-332(b) (applying to funds transfers 
from deposit accounts). 
70. Id. § 9-102(a)(52). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. § 9-317(a)(2)(A). 
73. Id. § 9-102(52)(A). 
74. See id. § 9-308 (“When Security Interest is . . . Perfected”); see also id. § 9-312(b) (providing 
for perfection by possession of money or by control of a deposit account). 
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B. When the Security Interest Fails 
As discussed above, the attorney will typically have a valid Article 9 
security interest in funds held to secure payment, and that interest should 
take priority over creditors’ later attempts to levy on client funds.  In 
practice, however, courts have not always recognized that interest.  In this 
section, we explore what went wrong when the security interest failed. 
1.    Hadassah v. Schwartz 
One such case arose in Ohio.75  The law firm of Bieser, Greer & Landis, 
L.L.P. (BG&L) represented Robert Schwartz, who paid a retainer of 
$150,000 to the law firm.76  The firm properly placed the funds in the 
Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts (IOLTA) client trust account.77  A 
creditor sought to garnish the funds in the account to satisfy an outstanding 
restitution order,78 and the trial court granted the garnishment.79  On 
appeal, Schwartz argued that the law firm possessed a security interest in the 
funds that should take priority over the garnishment action.80  Under the 
analysis above, this argument would have merit—but it did not prevail. 
There were two reasons why Schwartz lost.  The first, and most 
important, was waiver—Schwartz failed to raise the security-interest 
argument as a defense to garnishment in the trial court.  The second (and 
related) problem was the court’s misunderstanding of Article 9.  The court 
held that a written document was essential to the existence of a security 
interest: “Secured-transactions principles do not apply in this case, because 
neither BG&L nor Schwartz produced the representation agreement, and 
so there is no evidence of a written document creating a security interest in 
the funds.”81  The court cited earlier Ohio precedent denying a security 
interest for lack of a written agreement.82  The cited case, however, dealt 
with a non-possessory security interest.  Non-possessory interests do require 
 
75. Hadassah v. Schwartz, 966 N.E.2d 298, 301 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
76. Id. at 299. 
77. Id. 
78. Schwartz, a former attorney himself, was convicted “for mail fraud in connection with his 
scheme to defraud Hadassah Hospital, a beneficiary of the estate of [his former client] Beverly W. 
Hersh, of approximately $2,492,469 . . . .” Disciplinary Couns. v. Schwartz, 984 N.E.2d 1050, 1051 
(Ohio 2012).  Schwartz was ordered to repay the funds.  Hadassah, 966 N.E.2d at 301. 
79. Hadassah, 966 N.E.2d at 299. 
80. Id. at 301. 
81. Id.  
82. Id. (citing Silver Creek Supply v. Powell, 521 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987)). 
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a written security agreement.83  What the court failed to realize is that 
possessory interests are different.  As noted above, a security interest in 
property in the secured party’s possession does not require a written 
agreement—possession of the collateral, however, is enough to evidence the 
existence of the intent to create a security interest.84   
2.    Jackson Walker LLP v. F.D.I.C. 
Another case involved the law firm Jackson Walker LLP (Jackson 
Walker).85  Jackson Walker represented a federally chartered bank, Home 
Savings of America, that was in financial distress.86  The bank paid a 
$100,000 retainer to Jackson Walker.  The retainer agreement was an 
“evergreen” arrangement that required the bank to keep $100,000 in the 
retainer.87  As Jackson Walker performed work, it sent monthly invoices to 
the bank.88  The bank, for its part, typically paid the invoices as billed, 
leaving the retainer intact.89  Once, however, the bank let three of the 
monthly invoices stack up, and Jackson Walker transferred the funds to 
cover those invoices from the trust account to its operating account.90 
The bank then replenished the retainer.91   
The bank ultimately went into receivership and was taken over by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).92  At that time, there were 
three unpaid invoices amounting to $66,667.57 and there was $100,000 in 
the retainer account.93  The FDIC declined to pay the invoices on behalf of 
the bank and sought the return of the full retainer.94  Jackson Walker, on 
the other hand, argued that it had a security interest in the retainer for the 
 
83. See Powell, 521 N.E.2d at 829 (discussing a security interest in crops being grown); U.C.C. 
§ 9-203(b)(3)(A) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020). 
84. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(B) is incorporated in Ohio law at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.203; 
Official Comment 4 to U.C.C. § 9-203 notes that the possession and control alternatives “dispense 
with the requirement of an authenticated security agreement and provide alternative evidentiary tests.”  
U.C.C. § 9-203 cmt. 4. 
85. Jackson Walker LLP v. F.D.I.C., 13 F. Supp. 3d 953, 961 (D. Minn. 2014). 
86. Id. at 954–55. 
87. Id. at 955. 





93. Id.  
94. Id. 
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unpaid—but fully earned—fees.95  Jackson Walker filed a declaratory 
judgment in federal district court in Minnesota seeking a declaration that it 
could keep $66,667.57 from the retainer to compensate for the work 
completed.96 
The court acknowledged that a law firm could obtain a security interest 
in retainer funds but concluded the language in Jackson Walker’s retainer 
agreement was not specific enough to do so.97  The court explained the 
retainer agreement provided that Jackson Walker would “normally expect 
to retain this amount during the course of our engagement,” but noted that 
the agreement also gave the law firm discretion to apply the retainer to the 
payment of fees and expenses “from time to time” and that the law firm 
could then “ask that [the retainer] be replenished.”98  The court explicitly 
disagreed with the FDIC’s position “that all security agreements must 
include words such as ‘security’ or ‘collateral.’”99  Nevertheless, it concluded 
that “the language in the [r]etainer [a]greement does not logically reflect the 
creation of a security interest.”100 The court determined that “[t]he 
[r]etainer [a]greement does not commit the retainer to Jackson Walker as a 
means to ensure HSOA’s timely payment of invoices; on the contrary, the 
agreement suggests an alternative method of payment.”101  The effect of 
the court’s holding was to deny the security interest: the court ordered 
Jackson Walker to return the $100,000 retainer to the FDIC and then submit 
a claim for the unpaid fees to the receiver as an unsecured creditor.102 
In so holding, the court made two errors.  First, the court looked only at 
the written documentation of the agreement and ignored extrinsic evidence 
of the parties’ intent.103  This is problematic because both the text of the 
UCC and the authorities interpreting it are clear that no written security 
agreement is necessary when the secured party has possession of the 
 
95. Id. 
96. Id.  
97. Id. at 961. 
98. Id.  
99. Id.  
100. Id. 
101. Id.  
102. Id. at 962.  In bankruptcy, unsecured creditors share pro rata in the distribution of assets 
and are typically lucky to recover even a small fraction of their claim. 
103. See id. (requiring that the documentation reflect an objective or manifest “intent to form a 
security interest”). 
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collateral.104  Again, the court looked to the law of non-possessory security 
interests and ignored the UCC’s more relaxed treatment of possessory 
security interests.  Under the UCC, possession itself satisfies the evidentiary 
requirement to support a valid security interest.  With a possessory security 
interest, there is no need for an objective indication of intent—it is, instead, 
the parties’ subjective intent that controls.105  If the parties both possessed 
the subjective intent to create the security interest, then possession obviated 
the need for objectively verifiable documentation.106   
Furthermore, even the court’s interpretation of the written agreement 
seems erroneous.  The court is right that the retainer agreement gave 
Jackson Walker an “an alternative method of payment.”107  But an 
alternative method of payment is not necessarily inconsistent with a security 
interest.  Instead, that alternative method of payment can itself provide 
security.  Article 9 requires looking into the purpose of the underlying 
transaction.  What reason could Jackson Walker have had to create this 
alternative method of payment requiring it to hold $100,000 in client funds?  
The only plausible reason for Jackson Walker to want to hold the funds is 
to ensure payment.  The very purpose of an “evergreen” retainer, after all, 
is to offer payment security without requiring pre-payment of the full 
expected fee.108  Holding funds to secure payment is, at its essence, a 
security interest, and it is the essence of the transaction, not its form, that 
matters to Article 9.   
 
104. See WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL, 8 HAWKLAND UCC SERIES § 9-203:4 (“[N]o formal 
agreement in record form is required if the attachment and enforceability is based on the secured party’s 
possession of the collateral.”); In re Fish, 128 B.R. 468, 469 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991) (acknowledging 
validity of an oral security agreement when the secured party has possession of the collateral); Malek 
v. Gold Coast Exotic Imports, LLC, 107 N.E.3d 1013, 1018–19 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (“Typically the 
parties’ agreement that a security interest attaches to the collateral is evidenced by a written, 
authenticated security agreement. . . .  However, the parties’ agreement that a security interest attaches 
to the collateral may also be evidenced by the secured party’s actual possession of the collateral, and 
such possession likewise operates to put third parties on notice of the secured party’s interest in the 
collateral.”). 
105. See Wilson, supra note 67, at 146–47 (“[T]he secured party generally has two objectives: 
(1) creating a security interest in the collateral to establish the secured party’s rights in the collateral; 
and (2) putting the public on notice that the secured party has a lien against the collateral in order to 
perfect the secured party’s security interest.  Possession is one route to satisfy each objective for certain 
forms of collateral.  In the context of possession, the two objectives are often satisfied 
simultaneously.”). 
106. Id.  
107.  Jackson Walker LLP v. F.D.I.C., 13 F. Supp. 3d 953, 961 (D. Minn. 2014). 
108. See supra Part I (detailing the application of an “evergreen” retainer). 
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Jackson Walker’s communications with the bank make the purpose of the 
transaction clear.  The law firm could see that the bank was in danger of 
receivership, and it asked for a large retainer to avoid the risk of 
nonpayment.109  The court somewhat confusingly suggests that Jackson 
Walker would have protected itself if it had simply charged the retainer 
before receivership rather than trying to invoice the client.110  But if Jackson 
Walker had the right to charge the retainer at all, that right must exist 
because the client allowed them to hold the funds to secure payment.  As 
scholars of commercial have pointed out, the court’s reasoning “seems 
highly questionable[,]” as “[t]he fact that the agreement contemplated other 
forms of payment does not imply that the retainer was not security[,]” but 
rather “bolsters the argument that the retainer was provided to ensure that 
the client’s obligation would be satisfied if the other forms of payment 
failed.”111  
3.    M.M. v. T.M. 
A third case, from a New York trial court, appeared to fall into the same 
trap of overlooking the attorney’s interest under the UCC.112  In that case, 
a divorcing husband had paid a security retainer to an attorney.  According 
to the court, “the wife, seeking to enforce a judgment for unpaid 
maintenance, sought out an unusual cache of funds: the retainer deposited 
by her husband with his attorney to cover his legal fees in this 
proceeding.”113  The wife’s counsel served a restraining notice on the 
attorney and sought a turnover order for the funds.  Although the attorney 
argued that he had a “lien” in the escrowed funds, the opinion made no 
mention of the UCC and failed to address the potential existence of a 
security interest under Article 9.  As a result, the court held that the funds 
were still the property of the client and were therefore subject to the wife’s 
claim.114  Again, the husband’s attorney likely would have had priority to 
 
109. See Jackson Walker LLP, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 956 (explaining that the retainer was set at 
$100,000 “because they are at serious risk of FDIC receivership in the 1st quarter”). 
110. See id. at 962 (“The record undisputedly reflects that, despite the easy opportunity, Jackson 
Walker made no move to draw down on the retainer until well after HSOA entered receivership.”). 
111. Steve Weise & Stephen L. Sepinuck, Personal Property Secured Transactions, 70 BUS. LAW. 
1243, 1247 (2015). 
112. See M.M. v. T.M., 17 N.Y.S.3d 588, 598 (N.Y. 2015) (overlooking the interest of the 
attorney under the UCC). 
113. Id. at 593. 
114. Id. 
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the funds under Article 9, but, like the attorney in Hadassah, appeared to 
waive the issue. 
C. Why Do Courts Struggle with the Idea of Security Interests in Attorney 
Retainers? 
Cases like Hadassah, Jackson Walker, and M.M. v. T.M. demonstrate some 
difficulties in applying the UCC outside its normal realm.  On the one hand, 
it is easy enough to explain how the courts in those cases misunderstood the 
requirements of Article 9—mainly by overlooking the possibility of an oral 
security agreement evidenced by (and perfected by) possession of the 
client’s funds.  It is harder, however, to prevent similar misunderstandings 
from arising in the future. 
One thing that is unsurprising is that the courts misunderstanding or mis-
applying Article 9 are usually not bankruptcy courts.  Article 9 of the UCC 
offers a cohesive and largely effective system for creating, evidencing, and 
offering predictable priorities to security interests, but that cohesiveness 
comes with a price of steep complexity.  As a result, Article 9 rewards repeat 
players.  Bankruptcy courts and commercial-transactions attorneys who 
work with its provisions daily understand the system as a whole and are 
therefore less likely to make such mistakes.  In fact, it is the bankruptcy 
treatises and the bankruptcy court decisions that have been quickest to 
recognize attorneys’ security interests in the retainers they hold.115 
Non-specialists, on the other hand, tend to be intimidated by the 
complexity of Article 9 and more likely to have difficulty with its application.  
Professor Tim Zinnecker, a commercial-law specialist, suggests that this 
intimidation begins in law school—he asks (only somewhat facetiously) why 
“the Article 9 course, more so than others, [has] a tendency to invoke fear, 
loathing, tremors, twitches, dizziness, shakes, emotional distress, skin 
rashes, cramps, sleepiness, anxiety, loss of appetite, nausea, uncontrollable 
weeping, and hair loss?”116  Zinnecker offers with five explanations: 
“(i) absence of cases, (ii) terminology, (iii) burying clues in the official 
 
115. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 328.02 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
16th ed. 2021) (describing the system of security interests and retainers); In re On-Line Services Ltd., 
324 B.R. 342, 346  (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging security retainers are available for attorney’s 
fees); In re K & R Mining, Inc., 105 B.R. 394, 398 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (determining security 
interest); In re Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 90 B.R. 942, 944 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (acknowledging 
retainers can be used to pay attorney’s fees). 
116. Timothy R. Zinnecker, Nine Questions for the Article 9 Professor, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 311, 347 
(2020). 
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comments, (iv) pitfalls of literalism, and (v) exceptions, exceptions, and 
more exceptions.”117  But these pitfalls are not just a problem for students 
trying to learn the material that is (at least for now) still tested on the bar 
exam.118  They also create problems for non-specialist lawyers and judges 
who must apply the law.  
Each of the elements that Zinnecker identifies helps make Article 9 
somewhat impenetrable to the non-specialist attorney.  The terminology 
involved is specialized, including some words not normally part of everyday 
English as well as some ordinary English words used in an unexpected way.  
Reading through the Code can feel like reading a text in a language one is 
only semi-conversant in.119  And the exceptions (and the exceptions to the 
exceptions) can be easy to miss.  For example, a signed security agreement 
is the norm, and substituting possession for such a written agreement is an 
exception to the typical process, leading courts like the one in Hadassah to 
improperly conclude that a written agreement is required in all cases.120  
The difficulty in tracking exceptions is compounded when key elements to 
understanding the Code’s application (especially cross-references to 
common exceptions) are found only in the comments.121  As 
Professor Zinnecker notes, ignoring the comments can cause a reader “to 
draw an incorrect or incomplete conclusion, or no conclusion at all.”122   
 
117. Id.  
118. The creators of the Uniform Bar Exam have announced plans to remove “family law, 
estates and trusts, uniform commercial code and conflicts of law,” from the topics tested on the bar, 
though these areas may still be incorporated into “the context for legal problems or case scenarios.”  
Stephanie Francis Ward, Big Changes For Bar Exam Suggested By NCBE Testing Task Force, ABA J. 
(Jan 4, 2021), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/big-changes-for-bar-exam-suggested-by-
ncbe-testing-task-force [https://perma.cc/23AL-NRZN]. 
119. A common student misunderstanding is that Article 9’s frequent reference to “accounts” 
includes bank accounts.  It does not.  In Article 9 terms, an account is a right to payment.  U.C.C. 
§ 9-102(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020).  A bank account on the other hand, is called a 
“deposit account” in Article 9. Id. § 9-102(29).  The distinction matters, because timely filing a financing 
statement will typically give a secured creditor priority for a security interest in accounts—but priority 
for a security interest in deposit accounts requires that the creditor have control of the deposit account.  
See id. § 9-310 (requiring perfection by filing for all types of collateral other than those specifically 
exempted); Id. § 9-312(b) (providing that a security interest in deposit accounts can be perfected only 
by control); Id. § 9-322 (providing the general rule that priority in conflicting security interests will rank 
according to time of perfection or filing); see MARK TWAIN, TALES, SPEECHES, ESSAYS, AND 
SKETCHES 359–60 (Tom Quirk ed., Penguin Books 1994) (1890) (“[T]he difference between the almost 
right word and the right word is a really large matter—’tis the difference between the lightning-bug and 
the lightning.”). 
120. See discussion supra Part II (outlining how a security interest attaches). 
121. Zinnecker, supra note 107, at 352.  
122. Id. 
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In other areas where the law is complicated, the appellate process and 
subsequent published caselaw help correct errors and bring uniformity to 
the area.  With Article 9, however, there is a comparatively small body of 
caselaw.123  In part, this dearth of caselaw comes from the success of the 
UCC’s treatment of security interests. The Code is comprehensive enough 
and definite enough that those well-steeped in its provisions need not litigate 
many issues—a factor that again rewards the repeat players in this area of 
law.124  The difficulty creates a bit of a paradox, however.  That is, Article 9 
is clear enough that bankruptcy courts and commercial and bankruptcy 
practitioners will recognize and give effect to security interests in retainer 
funds without needing to litigate these issues often enough to develop a 
large body of caselaw.  Without an explanatory body of caselaw to draw on, 
non-specialized courts and practitioners are more likely to develop a parallel 
body of cases that mis-applies Article 9.  In the next part, we discuss how 
an unfounded fear of creditors’ claims has led some courts to allow lawyers 
to bypass client trust accounts. 
III.    REGULATING RETAINERS 
As discussed above, non-specialist courts and attorneys have difficulty 
understanding how Article 9 of the UCC applies to attorneys’ fee retainers.  
This difficulty increases the risks that retainers will erroneously be held to 
be subject to creditor claims, even when the UCC would have given priority 
to the lawyer over the competing creditors.  Regulatory bodies can 
compound these problems, however, when they extend this 
misunderstanding by expanding “advance-payment” retainers into 
situations normally covered by security retainers.  Illinois and New York, 
the two states at the forefront of this practice, expanded the recognition of 
advance-payment retainers to protect against creditor claims.  In practice, 
the extension of advance-payment retainers has introduced new risks to 
clients and created uncertainty without offering significant protection 
beyond the protection already offered by a security interest.   
  
 
123. Id. at 347–48 (noting other subjects have more caselaw than Article 9). 
124. The comprehensiveness of Article 9 also makes the Secured Transactions class different 
from most law school classes, in that many problems have a probably right or wrong answer.  As 
Professor Zinnecker points out, the Code offers “a collection of well-drafted, cohesive, and elegant 
provisions (notwithstanding any minor foibles I have raised) that offer bright-line, yes-or-no, clear-cut 
answers.”  Id. at 354. 
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A. Advance-Payment Retainers Offer Little Protection to Attorneys, but Raise 
Significant Risks for Clients 
The New York and Illinois approach to “advance-payment retainers” 
both apply what scholar Douglas Richmond has termed “sleight of 
hand.”125  That is, the states allow the lawyer to hold the funds intended to 
secure payment in the lawyer’s business or personal account rather than in 
the client trust account.126  These states allow the lawyer to treat the retainer 
as “earned up on receipt” even though it may be subject to refund if the 
contemplated work is not completed.  The arrangement is a pre-payment 
subject to refund—the lawyer has purchased the right to the lawyer’s 
services and will only get money back if the lawyer fails to deliver on those 
pre-purchased services.  Although the advance-payment retainer arose in the 
context of flat-fee payments (with consequently predictable payments and 
predictable points at which the funds would be considered fully earned), 
Illinois and New York both allow advance-payment retainers for hourly 
fees, where there is no such predictability.  That is, the client would be pre-
paying for a set number of hours.  If the attorney failed to work all of the 
hours paid for, the client would be entitled to a refund.   
In both Illinois and New York, the intent of this expansion was to protect 
the funds from the client’s creditors.127  Indeed, in Illinois, the rules were 
expanded to allow advance-payment retainers outside of client trust 
accounts specifically for fear that without this mechanism, attorneys would 
be unwilling to represent clients facing significant third-party claims.128  
However, in discussing this perceived vulnerability to creditor claims, both 
states looked only at the ownership of the funds and failed to consider 
whether the attorney’s security interest would offer sufficient protection.  
That is, both states looked to ethics law that made clear that funds in the 
client trust account belonged to the client, and therefore concluded that 
these client funds would be vulnerable to the claims of the client’s creditors, 
 
125. Richmond, supra note 27, at 138. 
126. See Dowling v. Chi. Options Assocs., Inc., 875 N.E.2d 1012, 1017 (Ill. 2007) (allowing 
funds to be held in a general account instead of a trust); ILL. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(c); N.Y. 
State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 1202 (2020); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l 
Ethics, Op. 816 (2007). 
127. Dowling, 875 N.E.2d at 1023; N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 816 
(2007). 
128. See ILL. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(c) (specifying that “[a]n advance[-]payment 
retainer may be used only when necessary to accomplish some purpose for the client that cannot be 
accomplished by using a security retainer” and requiring the attorney to state specifically if they would 
be “unwilling to represent the client without receiving an advance[-]payment retainer”). 
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as in the Hadassah, Jackson Walker, and M.M. v. T.M. cases.  As discussed 
earlier, however, this perceived vulnerability largely results from a failure to 
apply the provisions of the UCC.  In the ordinary run, even a security 
retainer should give the attorney priority over later lienholders outside of 
bankruptcy.   
The Illinois and New York approach creates logical paradoxes.  For 
example, attorneys for the later-bankrupt Caesars Entertainment Operating 
Co. secured a $3 million retainer.129  They admitted that the size of the 
retainer was intended as “an insurance policy against nonpayment” but then 
sought to characterize it as either a “classic” retainer or an “advance-
payment” retainer rather than a “security retainer” to protect the funds from 
other claimants.130  There was no dispute that the purpose of the retainer 
was for security, but the attorneys could not call it a security retainer or hold 
it in a trust account for fear that they would thereby lose their interest in it.  
The bankruptcy court in Caesars Entertainment upheld the retainer as an 
“advance payment” under Illinois law.131  Nonetheless, it seems likely that 
the attorneys would have been sufficiently protected even if they called it a 
security retainer.  The Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice treatise clarifies that 
“[b]y taking a retainer—even though it is considered a security retainer—a 
professional becomes a secured creditor, and hence has a claim on the 
retained funds prior to any other administrative claimant.”132  A security 
retainer offers the attorney protection even in bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, an advance-payment retainer, even when upheld, does not 
necessarily insulate the attorney from claims in the bankruptcy process.133  
When the attorney has not provided “reasonably equivalent value” for the 
retainer, it can be challenged as a fraudulent transfer or voidable transaction:  
The provisions of the Code regarding fraudulent transfer may also be asserted 
to challenge a prepetition retainer.  Under Section 548, for example, a trustee 
might assert that the debtor did not get reasonably equivalent value for the 
payment of a retainer, and that the payment was made while the debtor was 
 
129. In re Caesars Ent. Operating Co., Inc., 561 B.R. 420, 426–7 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015). 
130. Id. at 436–37. 
131. Id. at 438–39. 
132. NORTON III, supra note 49, § 30:10. 
133. 1 BANKRUPTCY DESK GUIDE § 2:65 (2021) (“The deposit of a retainer into an attorney’s 
general operating fund does not insulate it from disgorgement.”). 
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insolvent or the payment caused the debtor to become insolvent, among other 
causes.134   
Advance-payment retainers might be subject to slightly less scrutiny in 
bankruptcy, but the difference is not a huge one. According to one 
bankruptcy court applying the New York approach permitting advance-
payment retainers, the advance-payment retainer would not automatically 
become the property of the estate, but could still be subject to return if the 
payment exceeds the reasonable value of the attorney’s services.135  The 
unearned portion of the security retainer, on the other hand, would 
automatically become property of the estate—but even so, the Bankruptcy 
Code would still allow the court to award the retainer funds as compensation 
to the attorney for ongoing work.136   
As a result, there seems to be little actual benefit from advance-payment 
retainers.  Outside of bankruptcy, security retainers should sufficiently 
protect against later-arising creditor liens.137  And even in bankruptcy, the 
type of retainer makes only a minor difference.  Security retainers that 
become property of the estate upon bankruptcy filing can still compensate 
 
134. Eugene R. Wedoff, Prepetition Retainers in Bankruptcy: Whose Money Is It?, 1991 ANN. SURV. 
OF BANKR. L. 6, 6 (1991); see also Kenneth L. Kettering, The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act; or the 2014 
Amendments to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 70 BUS. LAW. 777, 807 (2015) (explaining that the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transactions Act was renamed the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act because 
its underlying doctrine is “aimed at policing conduct to the prejudice of creditors” and “is in no way 
limited to debtor behavior that is describable as ‘fraudulent’ in anything like the modern sense of that 
word[,]” but is rather “a regulatory tool”). 
135. See In re King, 392 B.R. 62, 71 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Funds that are collected as advance 
retainers do not become property of the estate and are subject to the requirements of § 329 only.”); 
11 U.S.C. § 329 (“If such compensation exceeds the reasonable value of any such services, the court 
may cancel any such agreement, or order the return of any such payment, to the extent excessive.”); see 
also FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(b) (“Every attorney for a debtor . . . shall file and transmit to the United 
States trustee within 14 days after the order for relief . . . the statement required by § 329 of the 
Code . . . .  The statement shall include the particulars of any such sharing or agreement to share by 
the attorney, but the details of any agreement for the sharing of the compensation with a member or 
regular associate of the attorney’s law firm shall not be required.”). 
136. See In re King, 392 B.R. at 70 (“Since the debtor retains an interest in the retainer, such a 
retainer is the property of the estate, and is subject to use by counsel upon compliance with §§ 329 and 
330.”); 11 U.S.C. § 330 (allowing the court to award “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary 
services rendered by . . . [the] attorney”); In re Seek Wilderness, Ltd., 368 B.R. 640, 653 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 2007). 
137. See discussion supra Part II (describing the benefits of security retainers).  Of course, 
security retainers may still be subject to liens that existed before the funds were handed over to the 
attorney, but in this regard there is no difference between security retainers and advance-payment 
retainers. 
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an attorney with judicial permission—the attorney will not necessarily give 
up the right to payment, as long as the bankruptcy court agrees that the 
attorney’s future services would benefit the estate.  At the same time, even 
though advance-payment fees do not automatically become property of the 
estate, they may nonetheless end up there.  Whatever equitable right the 
client had to the refund of unreasonable or unearned fees will become part 
of the bankruptcy estate, and “[i]f a flat[-]fee [earned-on-receipt] agreement 
is held to be executory, the trustee may reject it, and the attorney may be 
required to refund all or a portion of the fees.”138  Finally, if the advance-
payment fee is meant to compensate the attorney for any post-petition 
services, those services must still be approved by the court.139 
Advance-payment retainers, at least as interpreted by Illinois and New 
York, therefore do little to change the attorney’s position. At the same time, 
however, they significantly ramp up client risk.140  As Professor Roy Simon 
pointed out, New York “actually requires a lawyer to deposit advance retainer 
fees in the lawyer’s own account (or the law firm’s operating account) unless 
the lawyer and client have agreed that the lawyer may deposit them in a trust 
account.”141  Illinois’s rule on advance-payment retainers likewise requires 
lawyers to deposit them into the lawyer’s business account rather than the 
client’s trust account.142  
Once the money is in the lawyer’s business account, there is no restriction 
on the attorney’s spending the money.  That is why it is especially dangerous 
that Illinois and New York allow advance-payment retainers to include the 
pre-payment of fees for work the lawyer has not yet undertaken.  In such 
cases, the client will still have the right to a refund of the unearned portion, 
but the lawyer may reasonably have spent the funds on office rent, staff, or 
 
138. WILLIAM L. NORTON III, 9 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 172:18 (3d 
ed. 2021); In re King, 392 B.R. at 69–70 (citing In re Rittenhouse, 76 B.R. 610, 611 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
1987)); see also In re Shafer Bros. Constr. Inc., 525 B.R. 607, 619–20 (Bankr. N.D. W.Va. 2015) (finding 
that the attorneys were entitled to a reasonable amount for their services and allowing them to draw 
an approved amount from the client’s retainer before allowing an administrative claim to any balance 
remaining). 
139. See In re ACandS, Inc., 297 B.R. 395, 402 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (“Even if Kenesis had been 
paid a wholly nonrefundable fee prepetition, it was still required to file a retention application and 
obtain court approval as a condition of providing postpetition services to the estate.”). 
140. In recognition of this risk, the Illinois rule provides that “[a]n advance[-]payment retainer 
should be used sparingly, only when necessary to accomplish a purpose for the client that cannot be 
accomplished by using a security retainer.”  ILL. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15 cmt 3C. 
141. ROY D. SIMON, SIMON’S N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT § 1.15:4 (2020) (emphasis in 
original). 
142. ILL. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(c)(2). 
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other expenses.  If so, the lawyer will owe a debt to the client, but that debt 
will be unsecured—and unsecured debts, of course, are notoriously difficult 
to collect.143  With no guarantee of a quick cash refund, the client may find 
themselves without sufficient funds to hire new counsel.  As a result, the 
client may be unable to fire an attorney when the client has become unhappy 
with the representation.  Of course, this was the very result that New York 
was trying to prevent when it prohibited nonrefundable fees in In re 
Cooperman.144  Nevertheless, New York’s interpretation of advance-fee 
retainers risks creating a fee that is nonrefundable in practice, even if 
refundable in theory.  
Perhaps even worse, holding the advance-payment retainer outside the 
client trust account makes the retainer vulnerable to the lawyer’s own 
creditors.145  Again, it is anomalous that efforts to protect the funds from 
the client’s creditors might do more harm by making those funds vulnerable 
to the lawyer’s creditors.  Nonetheless, lawyers commonly finance their 
receivables.146  Lenders with a security interest in the lawyer’s accounts will 
have priority over the client’s unsecured claim for a refund of unearned fees, 
and will keep that priority even if the client later secures a lien.147  The 
lawyer’s creditors could not, of course, reach funds in the client trust 
account—that is one of the very purposes for which trust accounts were 
 
143. See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 15, at 42 (“Clients often are unable to obtain the 
return of unearned advance fee payments because their lawyers have either spent the money or 
otherwise made it unavailable to the client.”). 
144. See In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1994) (“Special nonrefundable retainer 
fee agreements diminish the core of the fiduciary relationship by substantially altering and economically 
chilling the client’s unbridled prerogative to walk away from the lawyer.  To answer that the client can 
technically still terminate misses the reality of the economic coercion that pervades such matters.”). 
145. Gregory Dunbar Soule, Attorney Misappropriation of Clients’ Funds: A Study in Professional 
Responsibility, 10 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 415, 416 n.6 (1977) (“Once the clients’ funds have been 
commingled with those of the attorney, there is an increased danger that the clients’ money will be 
used for the attorney’s personal expenses or subjected to the claims of his creditors.”). 
146. See Joseph Genovesi, Factoring Legal Receivables—How This Growing Area of Specialty Lending 
Helps Attorneys & Their Clients, ABFJOURNAL (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.abfjournal.com/articles/ 
factoring-legal-receivables-how-this-growing-area-of-specialty-lending-helps-attorneys-their-clients/ 
[https://perma.cc/3V4A-2WUZ] (“Factoring legal receivables has become such a popular option for 
attorneys because of its relative convenience when compared to receiving bank loans or lines of credit. 
Banks and credit unions will often refuse to advance funds to attorneys and law firms because attorneys 
frequently have very little physical collateral; legal funding is a viable alternative that exists specifically 
to advance capital to attorneys.”); Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 152 (1995) (“Law Firm 
Granting Bank Security Interest in Accounts Receivable”). 
147. U.C.C. § 9-317(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020); see supra Part II.A (noting how 
priority is determined regarding secured claims). 
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created.148  Allowing unearned fees to be held outside the trust account 
therefore significantly raises the client’s risk of loss due to the lawyer’s 
economic insecurity, even when the lawyer has done nothing wrong.149   
B. Advance-Payment Retainers Risk Lawyer Complicity in Concealing Assets  
Attorney retainers may offer a tempting vehicle for clients to try to 
conceal or shelter assets.  As discussed above, creditors who try to levy on 
the security retainer will generally find that their interest is subordinate to 
the attorney holding those funds to secure payment for their future 
services.150  At the same time, however, authorities agree that the client has 
an absolute right to terminate the attorney’s representation at any time and 
to take back any unearned funds.151   
Unscrupulous clients may try to exploit the room between these 
positions, putting money into an attorney retainer when creditors are 
circling and then withdrawing the funds later when the creditors back off.  
In one case from Ohio, for example, “[o]ver a three-year period, before and 
during the divorce proceedings, the client paid the lawyer over $850,000—
not for legal services, but to hide the money from her husband.”152  The 
lawyer placed the money in the client trust account and later wire-transferred 
it to offshore accounts belonging to the client.153  The Ohio Supreme Court 
ultimately disbarred the lawyer for this and other misconduct.154  Of course, 
the Ohio example is an egregious one, and the court appeared convinced 
that the lawyer was intentionally helping the client defraud her husband.155  
But even well-intentioned lawyers can inadvertently become parties to 
clients’ attempts to hide assets.  
 
148. See Lester Brickman, The Advance Fee Payment Dilemma: Should Payments Be Deposited to the 
Client Trust Account or to the General Office Account?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 667–68 (1989). 
149. Id. 
150. See supra Part II (detailing how the position of a secured creditor). 
151. See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 15, at 18 (“The Cooperman court . . . affirmed two 
longstanding principles of New York law: that a client may terminate a lawyer at any time, with or 
without cause, and that any attempt by a lawyer to hinder that right (as by charging a nonrefundable 
retainer fee) violates the Code.”). 
152. Karen Rubin, Don’t Help Your Client Hide Assets: Clear Case Leads To Lawyer’s 
Disbarment, THOMPSON HINE (Sept. 8. 2016), https://www.thelawforlawyerstoday.com/ 
2016/09/2790/ [https://perma.cc/WQR3-C7FJ]. 
153. Id. 
154. Trumbull Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Roland, 63 N.E.3d 1200, 1205 (Ohio 2016). 
155. See id. (finding “the misappropriation of client funds and fraudulent or dishonest conduct” 
warranted permanent disbarment). 
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Allowing attorneys to place unearned advance-payment retainers into 
attorneys’ private accounts increases the risk that clients’ attempts to conceal 
assets will go unchallenged.  One attorney sought an ethics opinion in New 
York, stating that the client had rebuffed the attorney’s attempt to return 
the unearned portion of a retainer after the conclusion of the 
representation.156  “The client asked him to keep the balance in his escrow 
account, telling the lawyer she ‘might need [him] for something else.’”157  
The lawyer wanted to know whether it was ethically permissible to hold onto 
the funds without any specific plans to provide legal services in the 
immediate future.158 
It is somewhat surprising that the authors of the ethics opinion did not 
question why the client would want to keep funds in the attorney trust 
account when no immediate legal work was needed.  This is a significant 
oversight, as only three years earlier, a bankruptcy court in the Southern 
District of New York held that “Attorneys Must Investigate the Source of 
Funds Received Where A Reasonable Lawyer Would Question the Client’s 
Intent In Paying the Fees.”159  Earlier cases had similarly provided that “[a] 
lawyer who blindly accepts fees from a client under circumstances that 
would cause a reasonable lawyer to question the client’s intent in paying the 
fees accepts the fees at his peril,” and that a lawyer who fails to inquire into 
the source of the fee risks being “charged with knowledge of any intent on 
the part of the transferor to hinder, delay, or defraud.”160 
In spite of this precedent, the opinion author did not advise the attorney 
to inquire into the client’s purpose, but instead assured the attorney that he 
was “free to agree to that request.”161  The opinion author went even 
further, however, in reiterating that because New York recognized advance-
payment retainers, the lawyer need not even keep the funds in the client’s 
trust account if the client and lawyer agreed to put it in the lawyer’s own 
account:   
At the client’s request, the lawyer may retain the unspent portion of the 
retainer on the conclusion of a matter as an advance[-]payment of fees to be 
 
156. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 983 (2013). 
157. Id.  
158. Id.  
159. In re Parklex Assocs., Inc., 435 B.R. 195, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (capital letters from 
original heading removed). 
160. Gala Enters., Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 989 F Supp. 525, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
161. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 983 (2013). 
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used for unspecified future legal services.  Such advance[-]payment retainers 
may be treated either as client-owned funds, to be kept in the lawyer’s escrow 
account, or as lawyer-owned funds, subject to the lawyer’s obligation to 
reimburse the client for any portion ultimately not earned in fees.162 
The opinion’s blessing on the attorney holding the funds without warning 
the lawyer to inquire into the client’s purpose is problematic.  After all, this 
arrangement would not meet the requirement for a security interest; the 
lawyer would not be holding the funds as security for payment of any 
contemplated service, and in fact the lawyer had not even agreed to provide 
further service.  Under Article 9, one of the elements to create a security 
interest is that value must be given; here, however, the funds were to be put 
in the lawyer’s possession without any commitment to extend value in 
return.163  
The opinion is even more problematic for suggesting that the funds could 
be placed in the lawyer’s own accounts.  This procedure would make the 
funds nearly untraceable by the client’s legitimate creditors. As other 
scholars have explained, “absent an obligation imposed by law or contract, 
a lawyer has no obligation to seek out and notify creditors of the lawyer’s 
client of the receipt of funds belonging in whole or in part to the client.”164  
When holding client funds in a trust account, lawyers must explicitly account 
for those funds.  And even though the creditors’ claims may be subordinate 
to the lawyer’s own security interest, creditors would at least have the 
possibility of reaching the funds when the representation terminates and the 
lawyer no longer has an interest in the funds to secure payment.  But if the 
funds are moved into the lawyer’s own accounts and treated as the lawyer’s 
own money before any work is done to earn those fees—and before such 
work is even contemplated—then the risk is even greater.  The client interest 
is at risk if the lawyer spends or dissipates the funds and then cannot return 
unused funds to the client.  And legitimate creditors also run the risk that 
they might have no way to identify the existence or location of funds 
belonging to the client—it would be very easy for the client to use the 
lawyer’s services to hide money from creditors.165   
 
162. Id.  
163. U.C.C. § 9-203 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020). 
164. Schuwerk & Hardwick, supra note 1. 
165. In an even more troubling twist, the opinion leaves open whether the parties’ “attorney–
client relationship will continue during that period” while the attorney is holding the fees before 
undertaking additional work for the client.  N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 983.  If, 
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IV.    RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given the confusion regarding the relative rights between creditors and 
attorneys in attorney retainers, this is an area where bar associations and 
attorney regulatory bodies could offer useful guidance.  For example, non-
bankruptcy judges may benefit from guidance about the application of 
Article 9 to retainers.  Additionally, lawyers need guidance on how to take 
security interests, as well as how to explain the benefits and drawbacks of 
such an arrangement to clients.  We suggest action in three areas.   
A. States Should Limit Advance-Payment Retainers 
First, Illinois and New York should change their rules to specify that 
advance-payment retainers are incompatible with hourly billing.  Both states 
expanded their reliance on advance-payment retainers under a mistaken 
assumption that funds held in traditional Interest on Lawyers’ Trust 
Accounts (IOLTA) or client trust accounts would be vulnerable to claims 
from the client’s creditors. As discussed above, however, the law already 
sufficiently protects the attorney who takes a possessory security interest in 
the retainer funds.  Thus, there is no reason why unearned funds should not 
be held in trust.  Depending on the jurisdiction, flat fees may be considered 
to be fully earned upon receipt, and the advance payment of a flat fee may 
therefore be appropriately held in the attorney’s personal or business 
account.  However, when the attorney will be charging by the hour, there is 
no logical basis to treat pre-paid funds as “earned” before the attorney 
actually works those hours.  Pretending otherwise prevents well-meaning 
clients from obtaining the protections offered by IOLTA accounts and 
allows unscrupulous clients to pull their attorneys into asset-hiding schemes. 
Neither of those risks is worth the illusory protection offered by advance-
payment retainers.   
B. Lawyers Should Obtain a Signed Retainer Agreement Explicitly Referencing 
Security 
Second, even though Article 9 offers lawyers priority over client creditor 
claims, lawyers may be worried that judges will not understand the 
complexities of Article 9 and that courts therefore may not uphold a lawyer’s 
priority in retainer funds.  This concern is legitimate.  As discussed above, 
 
during this period, the funds are considered to belong to the attorney and yet no attorney–client 
relationship exists, it is hard to imagine what kind of questions a creditor could even ask to uncover 
the existence of these funds. 
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courts have struggled to apply the law of security interests to retainer 
agreements and have mistakenly rules against lawyers who lacked an explicit 
security agreement signed by the client.166   
To prevent against later misunderstandings, lawyers may want to take a 
belt-and-suspenders approach by having the client sign a retainer agreement 
specifying that the retainer funds are to be held as security for payment of 
legal fees, and perhaps even referencing “a security interest as the term is 
used in the Uniform Commercial Code, including Article 9.”  Under 
Article 9, such a signed agreement is not necessary either to create or perfect 
the security interest; possession of the funds is sufficient to do both.167  
Nonetheless, courts unfamiliar with the details of the UCC sometimes 
expect to see a signed agreement offering objective evidence of a security 
agreement.168  It may be easier for the attorney to obtain a signed retainer 
agreement at the beginning of the representation than it is to later write a 
brief explaining how possessory security interests are treated differently 
from non-possessory security interests under Article 9 of the UCC.  Having 
a signed retainer agreement can document the security interest in a way that 
offers clarity both to courts and to clients.   
C. Regulatory Officials Should Coordinate with Commercial-Law Specialists and 
Develop Educational Programs 
Third, states should create programs to educate attorneys about the 
nature of security interests.  National coordination in this area would be 
especially helpful.  For example, ABA officials who promulgate the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct could work with attorneys at the Uniform 
Law Commission who publish the UCC.  Together, these attorneys could 
develop common terminology for retainer accounts and could describe how 
retainers for security fit into the larger scheme of security interests.   
Though the belt-and-suspenders approach discussed above should help 
lawyers in the courtroom, additional guidance may be necessary so that 
lawyers may clearly articulate to their clients the benefits and drawbacks of 
granting the lawyer a security interest.  Clients should be made aware that 
their creditors may lose priority in the retainer cash—and they should also 
be made aware that paying a retainer to defeat those creditors may be 
regarded as a fraudulent transfer.  Adding a shared comment to both the 
 
166. See supra Part II.B (explaining when a security interest may fail). 
167. See supra Part II.A (outlining the elements to create a security interest). 
168. See supra Part II.B (noting case opinions that have encountered this issue). 
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Model Rules and to the UCC would make it easier for lawyers, parties, and 
courts to understand how the law of security interests applies to common 
retainer agreements.  For example, a comment may be appropriate in Model 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 dealing with fee arrangements.  At present, 
Comment 2 requires the lawyer to give the client “an understanding as to 
fees and expenses”—this requirement could imply an obligation to explain 
the effect of the client’s grant of a security interest in the retainer.169  
Making this requirement explicit in the comment could better inform and 
prepare lawyers to fulfill their ethical obligation.   
At the state level, regulatory officials should develop annual continuing 
legal education programs that help disseminate this information to 
practicing attorneys.  Information about security interests in retainers could 
be added to more general educational programs about handling client funds.  
Attorneys’ management of client funds is “an area of significant client 
vulnerability and frequent discipline.”170  It would therefore make sense to 
include these educational programs as part of an overall effort to increase 
compliance in attorney fund management.  Violations of trust fund rules 
“account for about fourteen percent of all disbarments and about eight 
percent of all suspensions nationally.”171  Better oversight and education 
about fund handling is needed to protect client interests, and attorneys may 
be more motivated to participate in such educational programming when it 
also includes information that can help lawyers protect their own interests 
in security retainers.   
V.    CONCLUSION 
It is clear that there is a great deal of confusion about attorneys’ rights to 
retainer funds.  When a client’s creditor tries to make a claim on funds held 
by an attorney to secure client payment, both attorneys and courts struggle 
to understand and articulate the relative rights between the attorney and the 
client’s creditors.  Current law protects attorneys’ interest in security 
retainers better than many practitioners or courts realize. Article 9 of the 
UCC recognizes a valid and perfected security interest when (1) a client 
delivers possession of funds to an attorney; (2) the parties’ subjective intent, 
 
169. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021). 
170. Cassandra Burke Robertson, How Should We License Lawyers?, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1295, 
1312 (2021). 
171. Philip F. Downey, Attorneys’ Trust Accounts: The Bar’s Role in the Preservation of Client Property, 
49 OHIO ST. L.J. 275, 276 (1988). 
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whether or not memorialized in writing, is for the funds to secure payment; 
and (3) value, broadly defined, has been given to support the transaction—
such as the attorney’s agreement to provide legal services on behalf of the 
client.172   
The complexity of the UCC makes it difficult for non-specialists to 
understand and apply its provisions.  This difficulty has occasionally led 
both courts and practitioners astray in analyzing the priority of claims in 
attorneys’ retainer funds.  Some reported opinions appear clearly at odds 
with the UCC.  And two states—Illinois and New York—have created 
unnecessarily risky procedures to avoid perceived vulnerability to creditor 
claims.  In light of these problems, this Article recommends that lawyer 
regulatory bodies take a closer look at the commercial-law aspects of 
attorney retainers and develop educational outreach programs to attorneys.  
We further recommend that attorneys draft retainer agreements that 
explicitly reference the term “security” or “security interest” when the 
attorney intends to hold client funds as security for payment and that the 
attorney obtain the client’s signature on the retainer agreement.  Even 
though the retainer is typically a possessory security interest under Article 9 
of the UCC (for which a written and signed security agreement is not 
necessary), the existence of a signed agreement may forestall later 
objections.  These explicit agreements may become less important as courts 
become aware of the interaction between Article 9 and security retainers.  
Finally, we recommend that lawyers explain to their clients the 
consequences of a security-interest retainer.  Lawyers may be understood to 
have an ethical obligation to educate their clients as to the effect of such a 
retainer.   
  
 
172. See discussion supra Part II (listing the elements to perfect a security interest). 
